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Abstract—We discuss the on-going worldwide activity to 
develop forward looking standards for quantum key distribution 
(QKD) in the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) QKD industry specification group (ISG). The long term 
goal is to develop a certification methodology that bridges the 
gap between theoretical proofs and practical implementations 
with imperfect devices. Current efforts are focused on the 
handling of side channels and characterization of the most 
relevant components. 
I . INTRODUCTION 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2][10] is a unique 
security primitive that builds on quantum physics, 
telecommunications and information theory. It employs a 
multi-stage protocol over an insecure quantum channel and a 
public authenticated and integrity protected classical channel to 
generate information theoretically secure cryptographic key 
between two parties (usually called “Alice” and “Bob”), even 
in the presence of an unconstrained eavesdropper (Eve). The 
requirement of authenticity of the classical channel can be 
dropped if Alice and Bob initially share a short secret. This 
allows enforcing channel integrity but reduces the scheme to 
key expansion. The expansion rate depends on the physical 
characteristics of the given quantum channel. The resulting key 
can then be used in symmetric ciphers like the advanced-
encryption standard (AES) or the provably information 
theoretically secure One-Time-Pad . 
The main advantage of Q K D is that it is information 
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theoretically secure [24] rather than based on computational 
complexity assumptions, as are existing key distribution 
algorithms employing public-key cryptography methods. 
Moreover, it provides composable security so that the security 
level of the key expansion protocol may be changed by 
choosing appropriate epsilon deviations from perfect security 
[22]. This key expansion primitive can be combined with any 
other composable primitives to again yield composable epsilon 
secure results (the new epsilon being the sum of the 
components’). The security of QKD is based on the laws of 
quantum physics and specifically on a model of the physical 
layer of the system. In this framework it is proven that the 
quantum bit error rate (QBER) bounds the information 
attainable over the quantum channel by an eavesdropper, even 
though the errors are normally caused by the non-ideal 
behavior of system components. Security risks connected to 
real-world implementations can be present in all key 
distribution systems [15]. In QKD security can be breached if 
the model used to prove security deviates from the actual 
implementation of the physical layer, opening so called “side 
channels” [24]. It is natural to try to extend the ideal of 
bounding risks to such imperfections that may be present in an 
implementation. The specification of how this should be done 
for particular implementation issues and the practical 
requirements that are necessary to enable the underlying 
security are some of the current challenges in the field. 
A world-wide effort to develop standards for QKD systems 
has been formed through ETSI [7][13], the QKD Industry 
Specification Group (ISG). Its focus is to combine the QKD 
security analysis with details of practical implementations to 
develop standards that could be used by companies developing 
QKD products. The ultimate goal is to develop a certification 
framework that bridges the gap between theoretical security 
proofs and practical implementations with imperfect devices. 
In some cases, this has stimulated further theoretical research, 
in order to make the theoretical assumptions easier to meet in 
practice. In other cases, it consists of defining the best 
engineering practice to approach existing theoretical 
assumptions. This framework is considered a “forward looking 
standard”. Most standards are based on a number of existing 
methods already in commercial use. Forward looking standards 
anticipate the emerging technology and attempt to provide the 
needed operational guidance, testing methods and verification 
to help advance new technology towards broad commercial 
adoption [8]. 
Another important aspect of the QKD technology is its 
integration into existing optical networks. An increasing 
number of QKD quantum networks and field trials from all 
over the world have been reported recently [20][4][5] showing 
the feasibility of QKD architectures that are far more complex 
than the original point-to-point dark fiber connection. The 
QKD ISG aims to assist the integration process by defining 
relevant standards for such efforts. 
Standardization is fundamental to promoting broad 
commercialization of QKD by building trust and consistency 
leading to certification. The standardization process is also 
highlighting areas of QKD research needed to support the 
development of these standards. A well-established set of 
standards would be beneficial both to potential QKD users, as 
it provides definition to what they might consider buying, and 
to QKD vendors, as it provides a framework for requirements 
and how to specify them. 
In the following, after a brief overview of the QKD 
technology, we provide a description of some of the ongoing 
standardization work in the ETSI ISG-QKD. A final discussion 
summarizes the work done and the questions to be addressed in 
the near future. 
I I . Q K D OVERVIEW 
There are four stages to the Q K D protocol. In stage 1 
quantum signals are generated (e.g., polarization of single 
photons), transmitted over the lossy quantum channel and 
measured. In stage 2, sifting, Alice and Bob exchange 
information over the classical channel to agree upon a common 
sequence of valid quantum measurements to work with. But 
within that sequence the bit values in Bob’s copy may be not 
be identical to Alice’s, i.e. errors might exist. In stage 3, 
reconciliation, Alice and Bob exchange information over the 
classical channel to correct errors between the two versions of 
their common bit sequence without exposing the value of their 
bits. In stage 4 Alice and Bob perform privacy amplification on 
their now identical bit sequences (e.g. through the application 
of a 2-universal hash function, which they select at random and 
that does not require any further communication), yielding a 
shared secret between Alice and Bob. There are several 
important differences between Q K D and conventional 
communications. Information is transmitted over the lossy 
quantum channel and error correction is sent over the reliable 
(e.g., TCP/IP) classical channel. The quantum information can 
not be re-transmitted and Q K D requires efficient error 
correction, (code rates greater than 1/2 and operating close to 
the Shannon limit), to enable extraction of some amount of 
secret bits while dealing with a high Q B E R (up to 11%). As a 
consequence, some variations on the error correction code 
configuration are possible that result in additional efficiency. 
Unlike the case of conventional communications, losses on the 
quantum channel (photons never received) do not affect the 
outcome of the protocol since the data is random, but only 
reduce the key generation rate. Measurement errors on the 
photons received over the quantum channel (i.e., the QBER) 
are a concern since they bound the level of eavesdropping that 
may have occurred, and limit the amount of secure key that can 
be extracted, if any. 
A typical QKD system based on the BB84 protocol using 
weak coherent pulses and decoy states is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Any system parts or any signals leaking out of the security 
perimeters, i.e. the dashed line boxes, (e.g., the channels, 
reflected light, electromagnetic emissions, etc.) can provide 
potential information to the eavesdropper (Eve). QKD is a 
technology that uses light pulses at a level where a quantum 
mechanical description is required and the bulk of the photonic 
components in a QKD system are optical or electro-optical 
ones. The sending unit consists of an attenuated laser, for the 
photonic signal source, and a source of randomness, to encode 
the outgoing photons. The receiving unit consists of a 
component for signal demodulation (i.e., using a source of 
randomness to select the measurement basis) as well as one or 
more signal detectors. The source of randomness can be either 
an active random number generator or a passive random 
selection component, such as a non-polarizing beam splitter. 
Control electronics (e.g., FPGAs and other special chips) 
manage the generation, transmission, reception and capture of 
the raw shared key. Additional control electronics and a 
computer (not shown in Fig 1) implement the remainder of the 
protocol and storage of the secure key. 
Fig. 1. Diagram of a generic QKD system based on the BB84 protocol using 
weak coherent pulses and decoy states. 
Photons are the typical quantum carriers (as massive 
particles are easily absorbed). A quantum channel must then 
be an end-to-end optically transparent medium, like an optical 
fiber or free space. Transmission through an absorptive 
medium implies a limit to the maximum distance that a signal 
can travel. In QKD, a Gb/s transmission rate often results in 
Mb/s secure key rates over a 50 km optical fiber. However, at 
the quantum level (i.e. extremely low light power levels), the 
main factor limiting QKD distance is the noise (dark count 
rate) of the light detectors employed. At long distances, this 
can impact considerably on QBER and reduce to zero the final 
secure key rate distilled by the system. In practical terms, this 
means a maximum reach of about 250 km with current or 
foreseeable technology 
The classical channel is a conventional communication 
channel and is used in Q K D for the classical portion of the 
protocol, which includes sifting, error correction, privacy 
amplification and authentication. It can be optical or electrical 
and except for application requirements, does not require tight 
time constraints. In some cases a control channel (a second 
classical channel) may support the quantum channel by 
providing synchronization and time alignment between Bob 
and Alice, and thus would have timing constraints. 
I I I . Q K D DEPLOYMENT 
Another important challenge for Q K D lies in its 
compatibility with existing and future optical network 
infrastructures. 
The E T S I Q K D group is working to provide a practical 
framework for exchanging information between a Q K D user 
and a telecom operator. Where a Q K D user can include a 
Q K D manufacturer and a telecom operator can include the 
person in charge of managing the network resources. In 
particular the optical links that will be used to connect the two 
Q K D devices (Alice and Bob). Facilitating the exchange of 
information between Q K D manufacturers and telecom 
operators can be a major driver to promote the deployment of 
Q K D on existing optical networks. It can also help to identify 
how Q K D should evolve to fit with the trends of future optical 
networks. 
Current Q K D deployments rely on dark fibers. A crucial 
challenge for the integration of Q K D into existing optical 
infrastructure is how to optimize Q K D as one component of 
an optical architecture, taking cost versus performance trade­
offs into accounts. In that perspective, deploying Q K D with 
existing optical traffic, using multiplexing techniques and in 
particular wavelength division multiplexing ( W D M ) is a 
major technical objective that has been pursued over the past 
years [4][19][6]. 
From the standardization viewpoint, our first objective will 
be to support Q K D manufacturers and network operators by 
providing guidelines on how to jointly express the important 
information they need to share in the context of Q K D 
deployments, and in particular their system requirements. In 
addition, Q K D manufacturers will also be able to express how 
their Q K D system can perform, as a function of the 
communication resources provided by the telecom operator. 
This analysis can be made relatively systematic by 
distinguishing the main architectural scenarios in a Q K D 
deployment, depending on how the telecom channels are 
operated. Once this architecture is fixed, among a finite 
number of possibilities, (e.g., the quantum channel 
wavelength-multiplexed with the bidirectional classical 
channel) then the requirements can address different elements 
such as: 
• quantum channel characteristics (maximum attenuation, 
maximum tolerated impairments), 
• available wavelengths, 
• stability requirements on some parameters (for example 
polarization), 
• maximum tolerable external noise (and available 
filtering), 
• rate and latency for the classical channel. 
By standardizing how this information should be specified, it 
will also allow QKD manufacturers to state a guaranteed level 
of service (secret key rate mean value as well as fluctuations), 
provided a specific list of requirements is met. 
We can expect standardization of QKD from the viewpoint 
of optical networking to help both QKD users and network 
operators plan QKD deployments. It could also serve as a 
basis for cost optimization, helping quantify the impact and 
the expected performances associated with the integration of 
QKD in a network infrastructure. 
I V . STANDARDIZATION FRAMEWORK 
For Q K D , information theoretic security proofs exist for a 
number of different protocols. However a standardization and 
certification framework for Q K D needs to consider aspects of 
the system beyond the underlying protocol and to look more 
widely at the implementation of complete systems. In order to 
evolve a solid set of standards for Q K D it is necessary to 
examine the assumptions that are made in such protocol 
security proofs and to study the manner in which they may 
vary in the implementation. In some cases, such as the 
substitution of weak coherent states for the single photons 
initially assumed in many protocols, it was already known 
how to extend asymptotic security proofs to accommodate 
specific non-ideal behaviors exhibited by real components. 
“Epsilon (ε) security” models [22] based on a quantifiable 
failure probability, ε, are the basis for much theoretic work 
and continue to be an important area of active research to 
support the standardization process. One of the challenges is 
to extend such ε-security models to other non-ideal behaviors 
of components that might otherwise introduce loopholes. 
However, the standardization framework can be even 
wider than this and should also consider how the parameters 
required as inputs to the security models can be accurately 
measured. It should also consider the engineering 
requirements necessary to ensure that best-practice is followed 
in terms of the design and operation of systems. Some design 
requirements may be imposed to eliminate potential risks 
while others may be introduced to simplify the security 
models that may be necessary. 
Standards will also take the ε-security model for a system 
and use this to specify how privacy amplification should be 
implemented based on performance data from the system in 
order to make a claim of secure performance. An overview of 
an approach to developing a standardization framework from 
early Q K D research is shown in Fig. 2. The top part of the 
figure shows the situation that existed during early research 
phases. A security proof for the idealized system that includes 
a number of assumptions about the components in the system 
is used to determine privacy amplification requirements, but 
details of the non-ideal behavior of the real components are 
not necessarily included in the security analysis. In the lower 
part of the figure we give an overview of approaches to a 
standardization framework for a QKD system. A more 
sophisticated, epsilon-security model is introduced that 
includes parameterized models of key components of the 
system. In many cases putting forward such models is not 
straight-forward and open research problems remain. The 
parameters that are inputs to the security model are derived 
from standardized metrology tests, where each test may 
provide multiple parameters to the security model. Arrows can 
be taken to indicate flows of actual values for a specific 
system but the model may also take into account the existence 
of engineering requirements (hardware and software), which 
may serve to reduce the complexity of the model. The 
requirements for privacy amplification are specified based on 
the security model resulting in a certifiably secure 
performance claim. 
Fig. 2. Overview of the approach to develop a standardization framework 
(bottom) from early QKD research (top). 
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In terms of developing well-defined methods to 
characterize the parameters of the major QKD components the 
Metrology for Industrial Quantum Communications (MIQC) 
project [17] was established by the EU. This enabled the 
metrology experience of National Measurement Institutes such 
as INRIM [11], NPL [18] and PTB [21] to be focused on the 
development of pre-standards to characterize QKD 
components and systems. 
Multiple approaches have been adopted to identify the 
most important non-ideal behaviors to address. Analysis of 
each of the components typically included in Q K D systems 
and investigation of known side-channel attacks have both 
proved valuable. Side-channels usually refer to situations 
where differences between engineered components and those 
assumed in a security proof may directly provide information 
or allow control not specified in the protocol. 
The above framework highlights the multiple areas in 
which standards are needed. Standards for the software 
components that implement the classical algorithms used in 
Q K D stages 2 thru 4 will also be needed. At present the E T S I 
Q K D group is focusing on the initial quantum stage for which 
a number of open questions need to be addressed. Five 
specification documents have been produced [7]. Current 
activities include standards for the characterization of key 
components including single photon sources and detectors. 
This will ensure that important details are tested and will also 
enable data sheets for components to be generated in a 
consistent manner, including pertinent parameters and 
performance figures to allow comparison between different 
vendors and manufacturers. This will include measurements 
needed to determine if appropriate countermeasures to side-
channel attacks are employed, how effective they are (i.e., the 
potential for information leakage) and, if possible, how to 
compensate for that leakage. Standards considering how to 
specify good practice in combining components to produce a 
system that implements Q K D functions safely, and guidelines 
for networking Q K D systems, will follow. 
V . SOURCE AND DETECTOR CHARACTERIZATION 
A major contribution of this effort is the characterization 
of the main optical Q K D sub-systems, initially single-photon 
sources and detectors. This activity will have an impact on the 
quantum community beyond that of Q K D . This will provide a 
list of parameters for specifying the performance of optical 
Q K D components and the development of appropriate, 
traceable measurement techniques for their metrological 
characterization. Such characterization is necessary to enable 
the efficient specification of generic security requirements for 
Q K D systems and will shape a validation and certification 
framework for wider implementation of this technology. 
Engagement with manufacturers has highlighted the 
importance of characterizing the physical performance of 
Q K D sub-systems in order to assure both suppliers and 
customers that the devices are operating as intended. 
Although characterization of classical communication 
parameters is a well-established metrological activity (even if 
research and optimization are still necessary), for quantum 
communication further development of these “classical” 
measurement techniques is necessary to cover parameter 
ranges that are beyond the interests of classical 
communication. These are, for example, optical power and 
detector characterization at very weak intensities — including 
down to the single-photon level — at telecom wavelengths. 
This is technically challenging, since no measurement 
standards are established for photon counting technologies in 
this spectral range. Indeed, where standards are present, they 
operate at microwatt or higher power levels, and are 
cumbersome to use for measurements at the quantum level. 
For example, a QKD source is specified by its power 
(mean number of photons per pulse) as well as its photon 
number statistics (a property peculiar to the description of 
quantum light). This is of prime importance for QKD security. 
In this respect, the quantification of parameters like the mean 
and variance of the number of photons per pulse are 
fundamental in guaranteeing the correct implementation of a 
QKD system. The complexity of such a measurement is due to 
the fact that this parameter is probabilistic and not 
deterministic. Additional complications occur because current 
test instrumentation cannot measure every possible photonic 
emission. 
The current metrological work has developed a 
measurement framework for characterizing the following 
devices in the 1.55 µm band: 
• attenuated-laser weak coherent pulse sources 
approximating single-photon ones; 
• gated InGaAs non photon-number-resolving single-
photon detectors. 
Traceable measurements for quantifying most QKD-relevant 
parameters of these devices were developed and implemented. 
However, this is just the beginning of the metrological 
effort for QKD. As new sources and new detectors, based on 
different physical phenomena, appear in the market, the 
metrology community needs to determine suitable parameters 
and develop measurement techniques for them. 
QKD utilizing satellites is also under active consideration 
as a solution for implementing QKD over global distances. 
Despite the fact that some metrological work has been 
performed to provide traceability for photon-counting regimes 
at wavelengths in the visible spectral range, the metrology 
community should develop characterization, validation, and 
calibration methods for single-photon sources, detectors and 
other relevant optical components (e.g. polarization 
controllers, intensity modulators, etc.) used in free-space 
visible-light QKD. 
Entanglement, as in entangled states or entangling 
measurements, is expected to have a central role in the next 
generation of QKD technologies. This ranges from the 
development of quantum repeaters and quantum networks, to 
the practical application of (measurement-) device-
independent QKD [1][14]. Accurate characterization of 
entangled states, development of measurement techniques for 
entanglement quantification and/or witnessing, and for 
estimating the entangling-process efficiency are required. 
V I . SIDE CHANNELS 
Q K D theory provides an information theoretical secure 
framework for the distribution of cryptographic keys but the 
practical security of real-world implementations crucially 
depends on how the system-models assumed in the theory are 
realized in the implementation. For example, if Alice were to 
shout out the bit values as she encoded them onto single 
photons, she would have released the information audibly 
without there being any imperfections in the optical model of 
the QKD device. As discussed, deviations of system model 
assumptions and implementations lead to side channels that 
are common to all cryptographic systems. In QKD, however, 
these are particularly relevant since the security of QKD is 
solely based on the functionality of the quantum physical layer 
and is not prone to algorithmic attacks, leaving side channels 
as the primary adversarial target. Widely known side channels 
are those related to the losses of the quantum channel and to 
imperfections of the photon source or the single-photon 
detectors. Each of these side channels leads to one or more 
ways to attack the QKD system, e.g., the beam-splitting attack 
[25] for the quantum channel losses, the photon number 
splitting attack [3] for imperfect sources and the light back-
flash attack [12] for imperfect detectors. 
It should be emphasized that side channels are not a 
violation of quantum physics, nor a demonstration that QKD 
can be broken. They are ways to get around the intrinsic 
protection offered by QKD using potential imperfections in 
the implementation. On the other hand, it is not trivial to 
guarantee that an implementation is free from such 
imperfections and the QKD ISG is working to address this 
difficult aspect. Proper countermeasures against these side-
channel attacks must be implemented. Metrology is needed to 
prove a countermeasure is effective, or that the relevant 
devices (e.g., the detectors) are unaffected by attempts to 
manipulate them [16]. 
The approach has been to accumulate a list of known side 
channels. For each side channel determine if it is applicable to 
a given implementation. If applicable, develop appropriate 
measurements to determine the effectiveness of the 
countermeasure. In some cases this could result in a need to 
redesign the countermeasure to reduce or eliminate the 
leakage. In other cases, it may only result in the need for 
extended security analysis, and ultimately, an adjustment to 
the final amount of secure key that can be extracted. 
The QKD ISG is focusing on the quantum channel since 
the data on the classical channel does not need to be 
encrypted, and conventional (but information theoretically 
secure) integrity protection must be used to prevent tampering. 
In the most basic case the eavesdropper is passive and simply 
reads information that might have been inappropriately sent 
out of the channel along with the intended quantum signal. For 
example, if the source sometimes emits a light pulse that 
contains more than 1 photon, Eve could read the extra photon 
and learn the information without introducing a disturbance to 
the quantum channel. It can be seen that in this case Alice 
herself copied the same informative bit onto several photons 
thus providing Eve with a way to circumvent the no-copying 
(or no-cloning) theorem of quantum physics [27]. Another 
passive side channel would be if the detectors were to emit 
some light upon detecting an incoming photon. In this case 
too, Eve might simply record the emitted light and associate it 
with an information bit without being detected by Alice or 
Bob. Again this clearly does not violate any quantum principle 
but must be avoided through proper system design. 
Eve is not obliged to be passive. She could try, for 
instance, to inject light into Alice’s and Bob’s systems in 
order to modify the usual behavior of the components or to 
learn about the internal status of their components (e.g., by 
detecting reflections from within the systems). On Alice’s 
side, one main example of such an eavesdropping strategy is 
the so-called “Trojan-horse attack”. Eve injects light into the 
system. If this light can reach a signal modulator and if it is 
subsequently reflected back to the eavesdropper it could carry 
information about the internal status of the modulator [26]. 
Modulator values are classical and independently reading their 
values would not mean a disturbance of the quantum channel. 
The Trojan horse attack is not due to a failure of QKD but is 
made possible where good engineering design is not in place 
to protect internal active components from such attacks. 
It should be noted that many side-channel attacks require 
specific actions by an attacker during the transmission of the 
key material itself. From the point of view of forward-security 
this is advantageous over conventional key distribution 
schemes where a copy of the classical data can be trivially 
stored for subsequent crypto-analysis. If a QKD side channel 
were to be discovered this would present a risk of data loss 
from that point forward but information exchanged before 
such a discovery would usually remain secure. By contrast all 
historic classical data protected by public key cryptography 
would become readable on the exposure of the private key, the 
discovery of a fast way to break the algorithmic security 
primitive or a defect in its implementation. 
V I I . CONCLUSION 
If quantum computers become a reality, the key 
distribution algorithms that are currently in use will be broken 
and thus research is on-going in the area of quantum resistant 
key distribution algorithms [8][9]. Q K D is one of those 
candidate algorithms. As an emerging technology, Q K D 
stands out because of its information theoretic security. A vital 
concern for market place penetration is standards and 
certification methods. We have outlined a work-in-progress 
certification model along with a brief discussion of the need 
for characterization of Q K D devices that operate at quantum 
power levels. Such characterization includes the side channel 
concerns that emanate from engineered components that 
attempt to approximate the theoretical models of components 
assumed in the security proofs. As we pointed out, the needed 
characterization is well under way at a number of the 
European National Measurement Institutes, while researchers 
are busy trying to close the gap between imperfect real devices 
and the security proofs. This standardization process is 
highlighting areas of Q K D research needed to complete the 
development of these standards. 
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